This paper describes how dependent (i.e. common cause and common mode) failures have been accounted for in the development of a safety case for the 'defuelling' of nuclear submarines. A brief description of the submarines, the defuelling process and the safety case is given, followed by a detailed description of the assessment of dependent failures using the Unified Partial Model. The results of the assessments were fed back into the deterministic and probabilistic models of the defuelling process. Cut-off values were applied to multiplicative claims in the deterministic model, whilst beta factors were applied to equipment reliability claims in the probabilistic model. Beta factors have also been used in the derivation of the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) and associated Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) for the electrical protection system. Finally, an assessment of alternative methods of calculating beta factors was made and the results were found to be comparable, although the UPM proved to be the most flexible and transparent technique.
Introduction
Dependent failure analysis has been carried out as part of the safety case for a new submarine defuelling facility at Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited (DRDL). The new facility is required in order to defuel Swiftsure and Trafalgar Class submarines, once they are decommissioned, prior to their eventual disposal.
The Submarines
The Swiftsure and Trafalgar class are nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN), designed to stay underwater, undetected for long periods of time. Both are powered by the same Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) technology.
The first Swiftsure class submarine, HMS Swiftsure, was launched in 1971 and was followed by 5 others, culminating in HMS Splendid in 1979. The Trafalgar class is a refinement of the Swiftsure class and was designed six years later. The first Trafalgar class submarine was launched in 1981 and the last, HMS Triumph, in 1991. The internal layout is almost identical to the Swiftsure class, although it is 2.5 metres longer. The Astute class will eventually replace both the Trafalgar class and Swiftsure class.
Pressurised Water Reactors
Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) are nuclear power reactors that use ordinary water under high pressure as coolant to remove heat generated by a nuclear fission chain reaction from nuclear fuel, and as the moderator 1 to maintain the chain reaction. PWRs are the most common type of power producing nuclear reactor and are widely used in power stations, ships and submarines. In Figure 1 below, nuclear fuel in the reactor vessel is engaged in a fission chain reaction, which produces heat, heating the water in the primary coolant loop. The coolant loop is kept under high pressure by the pressuriser so that it remains liquid at high temperatures 2 . The hot coolant is then pumped through a steam generator (heat exchanger) where heat is transferred to a
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secondary coolant. This coolant evaporates to pressurised steam and is fed into a steam turbine, which then drives the propeller shaft through a speed reduction gearbox. The secondary coolant is then cooled down and condensed, before being returned to the steam generator. The transfer of heat is achieved without mixing the two fluids, which is desirable since the primary coolant will be contaminated.
The Defuelling Process
Defuelling is the process of removal of spent reactor fuel modules using a mobile Reactor Access House (RAH). After cutting a hole in the submarine pressure hull, the RAH is moved into position above the reactor compartment of the docked submarine. The RAH is connected to the submarine via the coaming which is sealed to the hull to create a barrier against the release of contaminants, and to protect defuelling equipment from the environment. The RAH is a large, seismically qualified structure supported on bridge beams across the dock (see Figure 2 below ). It incorporates a Goliath crane with separate 37 ton and 2 ton hoists, a common long travel arrangement, a high integrity, dual channel electrical protection system and low level transfer trolley for transferring plant and equipment to and from the RAH. The defuelling process, which takes place over many months, is the process of using the RAH to remove the spent reactor fuel modules and other irradiated and contaminated equipment through the hole in the submarine hull. 
The Safety Case
A safety case has been developed for defuelling using the RAH. The principal safety issues relate to the movement of irradiated items. The development of the RAH and its associated safety case has followed DRDL procedures and these are in compliance with the legislative requirements appropriate to a Nuclear Licensed Site. The process began with an extensive hazard identification exercise of the proposed design, which led to the development of Safety Functional Requirements (SFRs) for each of the safety systems making up the RAH. In accordance with International Atomic Energy Authority guidance [1] each of these SFRs have been categorised to reflect their significance in achieving or maintaining nuclear safety, based on the unmitigated consequences of the fault condition. Each SFR is then reviewed to identify the Structure, System or Component (SSC) associated with fulfilling the safety function. A design basis accident is an accident which the facility must be designed to withstand without unacceptable radiological consequences by virtue of its inherent design characteristics or its fault responsive systems. 4 Note that these (and subsequent) figures are for illustration only and do not necessarily reflect the final design of the system. A deterministic safety assessment was carried out to ensure that, for each of the significant hazards identified (i.e. in the event of an unmitigated design basis accident 3 ), appropriate safety measures were in place. Each of the safety measures is associated with a certain amount of risk reduction, and multiple safety measures may need to be claimed in order to meet the risk reduction target for the specific Postulated Initiating Event (PIE) frequency and consequence combination.
The association of hazard, PIE, safety measures and consequence can be depicted graphically as a 'bowtie'[2], as shown in Figure 3 below for a 'Snagged Load' event.
In parallel with the deterministic safety assessment, fault and event tree models of the proposed design were developed in order to provide a more quantifiable assessment. This 'Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)' was used to ascertain whether the design would meet relevant safety targets for the site. These targets relate to possible on-site accidents and are used as part of the judgement as to whether radiological hazards are being controlled adequately and risks being reduced to as low as reasonably practicable. The probabilistic safety assessment covers all of the aspects relating to the risk assessment process, starting from the full list of initiating events provided by the fault schedule, and analysing the fault sequences using fault tree and event tree techniques to calculate the risk.
For each of the safety functional requirements which are implemented by electrical protection systems, there are associated Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) assigned. These range from SIL 1 to SIL 4, where SIL 1 represents the lowest integrity requirement and SIL 4 the highest integrity requirement [3] . The SIL sets a reliability requirement, or the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD), which must be met by the components making up each functional element of the system. The deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments together provide the safety justification for the design of the system and are thus a significant part of the overall safety case. Both assessments must take account of the possibility of dependent (i.e. common cause and common mode) failures as follows:
• Deterministic assessment: Wherever there is a multiplication of safety measure claims, there is the potential for dependent failures. A 'cut-off' value must be defined to account for these multiplicative claims.
• Probabilistic assessment: Where multiple similar components are used as components of a safety system, there is the potential for dependent failures. These dependent failures are modelled explicitly in the fault and event trees through the application of a 'modifying factor' which limits the overall claim on redundant items. • The PFD calculations, which define the SIL for each safety function, must also include a 'modifying factor' to account for dependent failures.
Dependent Failures

The term 'dependent failure' covers all definitions of failures that are not independent and, as used in this paper, encompasses both Common Cause Failure (CCF) and Common Mode Failure (CMF). The following formal definitions are reproduced from [4] for dependent, common cause and common mode failures:
• Dependent Failure: The failure of a set of events, the probability of which cannot be expressed as the simple product of unconditional failure probabilities of the individual events.
• Common Cause Failure: This is a specific type of dependent failure where simultaneous (or near simultaneous) multiple failures result from a single shared cause.
• Common Mode Failure: This term is reserved for common cause failures in which multiple equipment items fail in the same mode.
An example of a common cause failure is an over-voltage from a common power supply. For a common mode failure, this same overvoltage could lead, for example, to a system failure due to multiple relay contacts failing in the closed position. Common mode failures are therefore a subset of common cause failures.
Dependent failure can be a significant proportion of a system's failure probability. A study in the 1970's [5] presented evidence that dependent failures are significant and demanded that the design and operation of redundancy systems must include a concerted approach against them. The study indicated that design errors and maintenance errors are the most significant causes of dependent failure.
Guidance published in the wake of this report [6] sought to provide qualitative advice on the design and operation of redundancy systems. This included a detailed list of defensive actions ranked according to their assessed significance in the reduction of dependent failure frequency. It was recommended that functional and equipment diversity 'must be exploited to their ultimate' for high reliability systems. All other defences must be exploited to an appropriate degree; the greatest gains would be made in the elimination of design and maintenance errors, as highlighted above, and the adoption of fail-safe characteristics. Further, an independent reliability assessment was considered to be a significant aid to satisfactorily verifying that each defence was adequately applied. The guidance also presented an interpretation of the limited amount of data to give quantitative guidance at the system level to designers.
Methodology Overview
The method of assessment is based on the Unified Partial Model (UPM), which is described in detail in SRD-R-13 [7] and thus only covered briefly here. The UPM provides a framework for carrying out a structured assessment of the susceptibility of a system to dependent failures in an auditable manner. It has the advantage of allowing a derivation of a Partial 5 Cut-Off Limit or a Partial Beta Factor, using a single working structure. The Partial Cut-Off method can be used as a holistic approach, which involves assessment of the system level features (providing input to the deterministic safety assessment), and the Partial Beta Factor method is applied at the component level (providing input to the probabilistic safety assessment). An overview of the methodology is shown in Figure 4 below. 
Human Factors
Human factors assessments provided error probability data for input into both of the safety assessments, in particular the probabilistic assessment. Fault trees assume independence between failures in separate legs of the fault tree, i.e. that a failure in one task does not influence the likelihood of failure in another. Human error, however, is particularly prone to a number of potential dependencies that would challenge the assumption of independence. Many human errors are also sensitive to the outcome of a previous action, for example, the failure to reinstate a system following maintenance may directly affect the ability of an operator subsequently to detect and respond to an abnormal state. Consequently, human error dependency is considered explicitly and the modelling approach ensures that the calculated error probabilities account for any dependencies, thus they are not considered further in this paper.
Random versus Systematic Failures
Random failures are assumed to occur at any time for any component of the system. Systematic failures are those due, for example, to design or specification mistakes. There is an underlying assumption within a PSA that the failure rate for a component is constant. Confidence in the PSA will increase as the validity of a constant failure rate assumption increases. In turn, confidence in the assumption of constant failure rate will increase as the dominance of random failures over systematic failures increases. As such, the validity of and confidence in a PSA will increase as the system in place for preventing and minimising systematic failures improves. This is achieved by ensuring that design conditions are met through proper application of industry standards, engineering design standards and good practice, i.e. a Safety Management System (SMS). The better the SMS, the more confidence that design conditions are met, and the lesser the influence of systematic compared with random failures.
An effective SMS will help to minimise systematic dependent failures to a degree where residual dependent failures are more likely to be dominated by random effects. They are then amenable to effective analysis by methods like the UPM. In this respect, the SMS will influence both the validity of the UPM for analysing dependent failures, and the judgements made within the UPM. The better the engineering and management arrangements are within the SMS for minimising dependent failure, the more scope there is for making more optimistic judgements.
The UPM Method
The UPM assessment method investigates a number of factors to determine how vulnerable the system or component is to the potential causes of dependent failures identified above. These factors break down into three main categories: Design, Operation and Environment. The methodology further identifies eight sub-factors that need to be considered in determining the ability of a component group to operate as required within the overall system and operating environment.
• Design
• Redundancy (Diversity) -Design documentation.
• Separation -Design documentation and site survey.
• Understanding -Design documentation including function specification of requirements.
• Analysis -Design documentation and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.
• Operation
• Man Machine Interface -Design documentation and site survey.
• Safety Culture -Procedures and operator training.
• Environment
• Control -Operating procedures and access to systems.
• Tests -Design documentation and operational experience.
The judgement is further extended through the use of 'Feature Factors'. This is an extension of the judgement table which allows assessment between different areas of one system (for example, separation may be good in some areas but poor in others). An overall judgement of the sub-factor is then applied based on an 'average' of the feature factors. In this way, the reasoning behind each element of the judgement is clear.
The methodology was applied to key components and systems of the crane protection systems and the results fed back in to the deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments. An example of a typical assessment for load cells is shown in Figure 5 below. 
Application in the Probabilistic Assessment
Dependent failures can be modelled explicitly within fault trees by incorporating the common fault directly as an event within the trees. However, this is cumbersome for large models and instead the dependent failures can be incorporated through the beta factor derived above 6 . As an example, consider two safety channels whose unavailability (Q) is 1E-3 (for both channels C1 and C2). If dependent failures are ignored, then the total unavailability is simply QC1 x QC2 = 1E-6, which appears very 'safe'. However, if the beta factor is, say, 10%, then the total availability is calculated as 1.01E-4! This gives some indication of the significant effect that dependent failures can have on system reliability (or that over-conservative beta factors can have on the design). Dependency is considered to be one of the major limiting factors for high integrity systems, i.e. SIL 2 and above 7 . For each of the component groups exhibiting redundancy, a beta factor has been calculated and used to derive a 'CCF' value for the whole component group. These values have subsequently been used in the fault trees within the probabilistic safety assessment, as shown in Figure 7 below.
Application in the Deterministic Assessment
A procedure known as 'safety class analysis' is used to determine the number of safety easures required, based on the initiating event frequency of the hazard, the unmitigated radiological consequence, and the risk 'tolerability' of the site. In many cases, multiple safety measures are claimed against a single fault or hazard and thus there is a potential for dependent failures. A 'cut-off' value must be defined to account for these multiplicative claims.
The cut-off value for a particular system is derived using the UPM as described above. The schematic in Figure  6 below shows how the bowties, UPM results and dependent failure assessment are used to evaluate each safety measure and assign an appropriate cut-off value. If the two safety measures are judged to be sufficiently independent from each other then no further cut-offs are required to limit their multiplicative claim. 6 There are a number of alternative model types, including Multiple Greek Letter, Alpha Factor etc. However, these models require additional data which is not trivial to derive and can add unnecessary complication without necessarily improving accuracy. 7 Another significant limiting factor on system reliability is human error, specifically in the maintenance and testing of SIL systems.
Conclusions
A comprehensive assessment has been made of the potential for dependent failures within a modern submarine defuelling facility. An assessment of dependent failures was carried out using the Unified Partial Method. The results of the assessments were fed back into the deterministic model, providing cut-off values for multiplicative claims within the model. Similarly, beta factors have been applied to equipment reliability claims within the probabilistic model. Beta factors have also been used in the derivation of PFDs, and associated SILs, for the electrical protection system. Finally, an assessment of alternative methods of calculating beta factors was made and the results were comparable, although the UPM proved to be the most flexible and transparent technique.
Alternative Methodologies
Safety instrumented systems which have been designed to meet the requirements of BS EN 61508 require probabilistic evaluation to verify that risk reduction targets have been achieved. The importance of accounting for dependent failures has been recognised in BS EN 61508, which requires that this evaluation also includes a quantitative assessment of dependent failures.
An approach for carrying out this quantitative assessment is contained in BS EN 61508 part 6, annex D [8] . The guide suggests three avenues that can be taken to reduce the probability of potentially dangerous dependent failures:
• Reduce the number of random hardware and systematic failures overall.
• Maximise the independence of the channels (this reduces the amount of overlap, whilst maintaining their area).
• Reveal non-simultaneous common cause failures while only one, and before a second, channel has been affected, i.e. use diagnostic tests.
The approach in BS EN 61508 part 6 requires that a series of questions be answered, for which points are scored. The total is then summed and compared against a table of values to derive a beta value. The 'Betaplus' method is very similar to the method advocated in BS EN 61508 part 6, if marginally simpler [9] . The Beta factor is calculated explicitly from the summing of individual factors, modified by consideration of the 'diagnostic frequency' 8 . 8 The diagnostic frequency is the interval between proof tests (or auto-tests) on the system. This relates to 'diagnostic coverage', which is an estimate of the proportion of failures which would be detected by a proof test.
Application to Protection Systems
The design of the two protection channels is such as to segregate and provide independence from the significant effects of faults and hazards. This has been achieved through the application of a number of good practices, including the physical separation of equipment and other process or equipment hazards, segregation and the provision of physical barriers, and arranging the layout to minimise the effects of a fault. Both the BS EN 61508 method and the Betaplus methods were used to derive a beta factor for the sensors/final element aspects of the two protection channels, and the result compared with that obtained using the UPM. The comparison indicates that results are comparable with all three providing values of between 4.3 and 5% for the beta factor to be applied between the two protection channels. The method advocated in BS EN 61508 part 6 is heavily biased towards programmable electronic systems; indeed much of the reason for applying this method is to take advantage of the allowance for internal diagnostics within such programmable electronic systems. This same argument applies to the Betaplus method. The UPM method is, however, more flexible in its application: it can be applied to both the mechanical and electrical systems; provides more transparency in terms of the explicit subfactor judgements; and is less demanding on the amount of data required.
Whichever method is used for a particular application, the calculation of a numerical value should not take attention away from the primary aim of the analysis. The primary aim is to highlight vulnerabilities to dependent failure, and provide guidance on where improvements in defences against such failures can be made.
